Marc Lichtenfeld just exposed something

June 1, 2026

Marc Lichtenfeld Exposed Something


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Dear Reader,

Let me show you some napkin math that’ll make your blood boil.

You deposit $10,000 in your savings account.

Your bank pays you 0.4%.

That’s $40 a year. Forty bucks.

Now here’s what they do with YOUR $10,000…

They turn around and park it in something called “The 29% Account.”

It was started as a private “trust fund” for the wealthy elite and America’s largest banks and financial institutions.

At 29%, your $10,000 earns them $2,900.

They keep $2,860. You get $40.

That’s the game.

Bank of America does it. Wells Fargo does it. JPMorgan does it. BlackRock has billions parked here.

They’ve been doing it for decades. Eating financial caviar… while offering you sardines.

Since 2000, “The 29% Account” has turned $1,000 into $556,454.

That’s not a typo. That’s 25 years of 29% returns… compounding year after year.

And it’s available to any American.

Click here to see how “The 29% Account” works – and how to cut out the middleman.

Good investing,

Marc Lichtenfeld
Chief Income Strategist, The Oxford Club

P.S. $40 for you. $2,860 for them. Same $10,000. Click here to flip the script.



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Diller Made His Move on MGM When the Stock Was Down Bad

MGM Resorts was sitting near $38.50 a share after Q1 earnings. Record revenue quarter. Still missed on EBITDA. Still missed on EPS. Market focused on the compression and largely ignored the digital business growing 43% year-over-year. That’s the environment Barry Diller chose to move in. That tells you something.

On Monday, June 1, People Incorporated, formerly IAC, submitted a non-binding all-cash proposal to acquire the 73.9% of MGM Resorts it doesn’t already own at $48.30 per share. People Inc. already holds roughly 66.8 million shares, or 26.1% of MGM’s outstanding stock as of April 27, 2026. The remaining stake being acquired is valued at approximately $12.3 billion. The stated goal is to take MGM private. MGM closed up 15%–16% on the day. That’s not a gap on a rumor. That’s the market pricing a credible offer from a buyer with six years of insider knowledge and a board seat.

Diller has committed to recusing himself from all board deliberations on the deal. Worth emphasizing: this is not an outside party running a cold process. He has been watching this business from the inside for the better part of six years. The move to $48.30 after three months of institutional volume trading well below that level is a very deliberate statement about where he thinks the asset is actually worth.

The premium breakdown is where it gets more nuanced than the headlines.

  • 10.6% premium to the last close before announcement
  • 24.1% premium to the 30-day VWAP ending May 29, 2026
  • 30%+ premium to the 90-day VWAP ending May 29, 2026

A 10.6% headline premium by itself doesn’t explain a 15-point session move. The 90-day VWAP premium does. That figure captures three months of real institutional activity. A 30%-plus premium to that level is the buyer saying the market has been systematically mispricing this asset, not just on one bad day, but across an entire quarter of trading. That’s a conviction statement, not a polite opening bid.

Now for the financials, because the Q1 numbers are the whole reason this window existed.

MGM reported consolidated net revenues of $4.45 billion in Q1 2026, up 4.2% year-over-year and a new Q1 record, clearing the $4.37 billion analyst estimate. On the surface, a good number. Below the surface, Consolidated Adjusted EBITDA came in at $580 million, down from $637 million in Q1 2025, a 9% year-over-year decline. Adjusted EPS of $0.49 versus $0.69 a year earlier, a 29% drop. Operating margin compressed from 9.0% to 6.8%. Revenue beat. Everything underneath missed. That divergence is precisely the kind of result that creates a valuation gap between what a company is worth and what its stock price reflects in the short term.

Segment-level: Las Vegas Strip net revenues hit $2.2 billion, growing year-over-year for the first time since Q3 2024. Las Vegas Adjusted EBITDAR came in at $749 million versus $811 million in the prior year, down 8%, driven primarily by higher self-insurance expense and lower business interruption proceeds. Regional net revenues were $918 million, up from $900 million. MGM China grew net revenue 9% year-over-year, with 15.4% Macau market share during the quarter and a March exit rate of 17.3%. MGM Digital, which includes LeoVegas, generated $183 million in net revenues, up 43% from $128 million a year earlier. BetMGM reached sustained profitability with 6% revenue growth from operations, and management held its guidance for $500 million in adjusted EBITDA by FY 2027.

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Here’s where I’m at on the margin story: the Q1 compression had specific causes. Higher self-insurance costs. A new intercompany branding agreement between MGM and MGM China that added $23 million in fee expense that wasn’t there before. Weather disruptions across regional properties. None of those are permanent. They’re the kind of one-time headwinds that a public market tends to treat as ongoing because it’s easier than doing the work to disaggregate them. A board member who has been inside this business for six years knows the difference. That’s the edge Diller is acting on.

On the deal itself: non-binding at this stage, standard. What matters is that People Inc. has explicitly stated the proposal carries no financing condition. That’s a meaningful structural detail. A committed capital structure behind a no-financing-out offer is fundamentally different from a contingent expression of interest. People Inc. plans to fund through a combination of cash at both entities, plus debt and equity commitments. The board will scrutinize the financing. That’s their job.

And they should look closely at People Inc.’s own recent numbers. Q1 2026 EPS came in at -$0.94 against an expected -$0.29. Revenue of $422.9 million versus a $520 million consensus. That miss is not trivial. It doesn’t automatically invalidate the financing plan, but any independent special committee worth its fee is going to push on that. The gap between what People Inc. said it would earn and what it actually earned is going to be exhibit A in the early negotiation back-and-forth.

If the deal closes, People Inc. ends up owning just over 50.1% of the combined equity. MGM management stays in place. Multi-jurisdictional gaming regulatory approvals are required. This process will take months, not weeks.

$48.30 is the ceiling in the absence of a competing bid. Shares above that level imply the market is pricing in a bump or a third-party acquirer, both of which carry their own risk. The $43–$44 range is near-term support. The $38.50 area is the downside anchor if the deal falls apart entirely. Implied volatility will stay elevated throughout the regulatory review period. Gaming M&A across multiple jurisdictions does not have a clean vol compression path.

The part worth sitting with: Diller didn’t move when MGM was performing. He moved when one quarter of identifiable, non-structural headwinds compressed the stock to a level that didn’t reflect three years of digital business building. Whether the board agrees $48.30 captures the full value of what that digital trajectory is worth is the only question that matters now. And that answer is not coming quickly.


For informational and educational purposes only. Not investment advice. Trading involves risk, including loss of principal.